The comments by the correspondents of the two Qatari-owned satellite TV channels, Al Jazeera and Al Arabi, from outside the Imam Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab Mosque in Doha did not match the image broadcast from inside the mosque. The correspondents said that the Emir of Qatar, Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, and his father and predecessor, the Father Emir Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, attended the funeral prayer for the head of the Hamas movement, Ismail Haniyeh. But the image broadcast by the two satellite channels has showed something else. 

To be precise, there were two sets of images.To create some margin of manoeuvre for themselves, the two channels mentioned in a corner of the screen that the broadcast images where pre-recorded from a live event which took place “a short while ago.” They meant to say that the broadcast was not carrying a live event. But why where there two sets of images of the same event? The reason was because it was not one single event, but two. 

The first images showed the emir of Qatar, Sheikh Tamim, with Palestinian figures and guests. If one paid close attention to the accompanying sound and the movement of the worshippers, one would have noticed there were two different sets of images. 

One set was of the Friday prayers, including the sermon, and the usual scenes of supplication on this day of the week. But the prayer scene showing the Father Emir, Sheikh Hamad, from prostration and supplication, was beyond any doubt from the Friday prayers. Some of the images that were quickly disseminated on the X platform, minutes before the two channels broadcast the funeral prayer, caused the two channels’ viewers to suspect that these might be composite images and not TV coverage from one single place. The images showed the emir and his father to be present at the mosque. 

The emir was without a headband, while his father wore a hygienic mask. The scene of the funeral prayers broadcast by the channels did not show the emir, his father or Qatari dignitaries. The reason for that was that there was a second set of images, those of the funeral prayers, in which Khaled Meshaal and other senior Hamas leaders were shown to be performing prayers, while standing and in sequence without prostration, as they recited Surahs, the Shahada, and supplications that were at variance from the usual prayers. In that event, there was no trace of Emir Sheikh Tamim, his father, or any of the well-known Qatari figures. 

In the editing of the footage and its hasty broadcast, the sound was covered with the comments of the reporters standing outside the mosque. The editors tried to give viewers the impression that there was a thick crowd when the body was carried out of the mosque. There is no doubt that no one would have noticed there was anything amiss had it not been for the absence of Emir Sheikh Tamim, whose towering height would have made his presence easily noticeable. 

The emir was not there during the funeral prayer nor when the body of Haniyeh was being carried out of the mosque. In the edited footage, which was widely disseminated on X, the cuts between shots were conspicuous as the editor was unable to come up with a sequence that combines the scene of the emir while sitting and listening to the Friday sermon with the scene where he disappears from the footage of the funeral prayer and the subsequent procession. There was no mention of the emir attending the funeral, both in the Qatar News Agency wire nor in the “official” Qatari posts on the X platform. 

By being careful not to show Emir Sheikh Tamim praying over the body of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh, Qatar had two objectives in mind. 

The Israelis never concealed their intent to seek revenge over those whom they see as having helped Hamas and enabled it to finance and carry out Operation “Al Aqsa Flood.” 

Qatar was mentioned by name in this regard. Perhaps what spared its direct mention this time is its ongoing role in mediating the release of Israeli captives held by Hamas in Gaza. One day, the image of the emir of Qatar praying over the body of the Hamas leader assassinated by Israel could serve as evidence of guilt and as justification for revenge. The Israeli captives (or the bodies of those killed among them) would eventually return home, and Israel could be continuing its war on the Palestinians and their leaders, in Gaza, the West Bank, and wherever they may be. 

Over the past decades, the Qataris have excelled at using others and then dispensing with them as when no longer needed. When they sought to make sure the US moved its military bases from Saudi Arabia to Qatar, it approached Washington through its Israeli allies. Normalisation between the Jewish state and Arab countries, beyond those sharing borders with Israel, specifically Egypt and Jordan, began in Qatar. Israeli officials flocked to Doha as Al Jazeera filled its screens with Israeli officials and experts. 

Arab viewers discovered Israeli figures on the Qatari-financed channel before any other TV outlet. As soon as Americans moved their bases to Al-Siliya and Al-Udeid, the Qataris turned against the Israelis. They ratcheted up their media hostility but kept political animus under control. Then it was time to bring the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas, and Hezbollah on stage. Doha became the headquarters of the Brotherhood’s international organisation and the Hamas movement, while Al Jazeera sang the praises of Bashar al-Assad and Hezbollah’s steadfastness (in contrast to the “unmanly Saudis,” as al-Assad called them). 

Then, the Qataris turned on Assad and Hezbollah, to bet instead on Turkey, treating Recep Tayyip Erdogan as if he was a Muslim sultan of Ottoman proportions, while they pursued various goals during the so-called Arab Spring. Many of their bets came to fruition in Egypt, Yemen, Syria and Tunisia. Then, as the moderation front held its ground and responded to the challenge, the Qataris embarked on a reconciliation process in the region. Their interest in the Muslim Brotherhood dimmed and Erdogan’s stature declined, but Hamas remained their favourite. No voice was louder than that of the Palestinians and their cause, and whoever endorsed that cause was welcome aboard. But, then, Tehran came into the picture snatching away the Palestinian decision card from Qatar’s hands and putting it in the hands of the supreme guide. 

No one knows exactly how much the Qataris knew about Operation “Al Aqsa Flood”, but they realised from day one after October 7 the scope of the predicament they faced because of their ties to Hamas. They reckoned that it was time to abandon Hamas. But before dropping the militant Palestinian group, they felt they had to continue ensuring the important task of mediation. Doha still had a lot it could achieve by appearing to Americans as an honest broker and to the Israelis as an indispensable mediator. 

The Israelis were negotiating with Hamas through Qatar, but the Qataris knew what the Israelis, especially Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu, had in mind. Time was therefore on Qatar’s side. The goal of the negotiations was to bide for time, as nobody knew what would happen next. Qatar was not ready to relinquish the card of Hamas’ presence in Doha. It had mastered the negotiation game to the point that the ploys pursued by Iran, through its Hezbollah proxy, seemed far removed from what was happening in Doha or Cairo. 

Netanyahu had in mind specific plans to achieve before his political demise, as Doha had hoped. He struck two destabilising blows, the first in Beirut by killing the second most important figure in Hezbollah, and the other blow in Tehran by carrying out an assassination, which jolted every one, as it eliminated the leader of Hamas. The first Qatari reaction after the announcement of Haniyeh’s assassination was to say that “negotiations are meaningless” as“you don’t kill the negotiator while whom you are negotiating.” The negotiation card was hence no more, and it was time to abandon Hamas’s presence in Doha. 

The poor editing of the television footage, which ill-combined the Friday prayers with the funeral prayers in Doha, was evidence of an improvised attempt to concoct a formula in which Emir Sheikh Tamim would be both present and absent at Haniyeh’s funeral. Netanyahu did not give Doha enough time to prepare for such a contingency. But what happened indicates that the Qataris are quick, as always, to dispense with a burnt card and move on to a new stage. The Israelis went to Cairo two days after Haniyeh’s assassination under pressure from the US, but they did not find the Qataris there, and returned empty-handed as the Egyptians had nothing new to offer. 

The Qatari media will continue to glorify Ismail Haniyeh, but the Qataris will not miss the opportunity provided by Netanyahu to get rid of the burden and responsibility of Hamas. There were two prayers in Doha; one was the Friday prayer attended by the emir, and the other was the funeral prayer for Hamas in Doha. 

Haitham El Zobaidi is the Executive Editor of Al Arab Publishing House.