Turkey as the terminus for a new pipeline bringing gas up from the world’s largest gas field in the Gulf off the peninsula of Qatar. Turkey as the premier gas hub serving Europe. Turkey as a crucial node in the emerging Eastern Mediterranean electricity network. And Turkey as the northern anchor of a growing regional power system integrating vast renewable energy investments expanded across Syrian territory. The energy role that Turkey could theoretically wield as a result of the collapse of the half-a-century-old Assad dynasty of neighbouring Syria are immeasurable.

Having backed the winning side in the 13-year-long multi-sided Syria conflict, the Turks, who are working closely with the militants seeking to erect a viable post-Assad government in Damascus, are very much in the room when it comes to shaping Syria’s future.

The energy prize could be huge. But not, say the sceptics, if the new Syria dissolves into a case of rats in a barrel. Renewed conflict could deal a fatal blow to many of the energy ambitions currently causing tangible excitement among Turkish energy officials, but there again, even a stabilised western side of the country might open the door to some tempting investments. One of those could be a Qatar-Saudi Arabia-Jordan-Syria-Turkey pipeline that would ship vast volumes of gas from the Qatari side of the North Dome/South Pars field shared with Iran in the Gulf to Turkey for forwarding to Europe.

As observed in a commentary by Karim Elgendy, a Chatham House associate fellow who specialises in analysing fields including the energy transition, Ankara’s vision is that Turkey will serve as the key transit point between gas producers to its east and south, and markets to its west.

A new stability in Syria could allow, concurs Elgendy, “the revival of the long-dormant pipeline project to connect Qatari natural gas fields with Turkey via Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Syria. The plan had been rejected by the Assad regime, reportedly to protect Russian gas exports into European markets [on behalf of ally Russia]. It took the Turkish energy minister, Alparslan Bayraktar, just two days after [president Bashar al-]Assad’s fall to publicly express openness to revisiting the plan.”

“By creating a gas pipeline to the west of Syria,” continues Elgendy, “and connecting to the existing Arab Gas Pipeline network (which links Syria, Jordan, and Egypt) Turkey could [also] offer regional gas producers such as Israel and Egypt a more commercially viable route to European markets than current [liquefied natural gas] LNG alternatives. 

“This would effectively challenge the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF) – an alliance that includes Egypt, Israel, Greece, Cyprus, Palestine, Jordan, Italy, and France. 

“The EMGF’s flagship EastMed Pipeline project has struggled with technical and financial viability, with its proposed 1,900-kilometer [1,181-mile] deepwater pipeline connecting Israel and Cyprus to Greece making little progress. The pipeline was also dealt a significant blow when the US withdrew support in 2022.

“A land-based route through Syria to Turkey’s existing infrastructure would provide a shorter, technically simpler, and more cost-effective alternative.”

Would a “stable” Syria cooperating with Turkey in energy policy prove the missing link for multiple major gas pipeline, renewables and grid investments in the Middle East? (Credit: CIA World Factbook, cc, public domain).

Does it all sound too good to be true? Perhaps. Another downside for Turkey in betting on a gas hub-and-spoke model to reap lucrative energy export rewards is that, even if Syria does stabilise in a favourable way for Ankara, Europe’s appetite for gas will fall off beyond 2030 amid the push for net zero to address the climate crisis. Not surprisingly, for international financiers the attraction of investments in fossil fuel infrastructure is on the wane.  

The critical decision of Turkey, notes Elgendy, is “whether to pursue traditional gas hub ambitions that may face diminishing returns, seeking influence through traditional pipeline politics – or to leverage this moment to position itself at the centre of the region’s clean energy transition”. 

Concludes the analyst: “Prioritizing sustainable energy over conventional gas networks seems the best method by which Turkey could transform its temporary strategic advantage into lasting regional influence.

“Regardless, the choices Ankara makes in the coming months will be pivotal for its future as a regional hub – and for the entire Eastern Mediterranean energy landscape.”

The cost of the Syrian post-war reconstruction will, by some estimates, run to an estimated $400bn. Given such enormous expenditure and opportunities to start afresh in infrastructure, for Syria now might be the time to bite the bullet and go big on energy beyond fossil fuels. And, alongside his enthusiasm for gas, Bayraktar has indicated that Ankara would be interested in collaborating with Syria in this area.

Bayraktar, who in late November took a Turkish green energy roadshow to London, during which, in a meeting coordinated by JPMorgan, he spoke with senior executives of global companies operating in renewables, says Turkey aims to boost its combined wind (offshore and onshore) and solar (including floating solar) energy capacity from 30 gigawatts to 120 GW by 2035 with $108bn of public and private investment.

Though often the target of brickbats for its continued major use of coal in generating power (the country now leads Europe in this particular “dirty” table), Turkey also regularly wins plaudits for the rate of expansion seen in its renewable energy network and is looking to build a range of large and small nuclear power plants, despite serious delays. Some 43% of electricity in the country was generated through wind, solar and hydroelectric in 2023.

At the late November Istanbul Energy Forum, Alkim Bag Gullu, director of SHURA Energy Transition Center, pointed out Turkey’s ambitious goals in building up renewables within the energy mix, including rollouts of battery energy storage capacity. “[..A]s of today, approximately 35 gigawatts of battery energy storage capacity has been allocated to be integrated into wind and solar plants,” he said.

For practical assistance in managing an energy revolution, it seems Syria need look no further than its northern neighbour.

“This [renewables] model is particularly relevant given Syria’s abundant solar resources and urgent need to rebuild its power generation capacity to fuel economic development,” says Elgendy.

Indeed, a Turkish-Syrian grid integration drawing on a radical commitment to renewables could even drive development of the emerging Eastern Mediterranean electricity network.

For Elgendy, the network’s other components – the Egypt-Saudi Arabia Inter-connector, the Great Sea Inter-connector (Israel-Cyprus-Greece), and the GREGY Inter-connector (Egypt-Greece) – collectively represent “an emerging power architecture that could transform regional energy security and support the integration of renewables. It could also foster economic cooperation and help reduce geopolitical tensions through increased interdependence”.