Cleveland Cavaliers Receive: Donovan Mitchell

Utah Jazz Receive: Ochai Agbaji, Collin Sexton (sign-and-trade), Lauri Markkanen, 2025 first-round pick, 2026 first-round swap, 2027 first-round pick, 2028 first-round swap, 2029 first-round pick

Cleveland’s grade will be subject to all sorts of revisionist history now that Markkanen has turned into an All-Star. Don’t give into that temptation.

Markkanen wasn’t headed down that path as a member of the Cavs. Utah has deployed him as a high-volume play-finisher amid lineups with virtually zero ball-dominance around him and streamlined spacing. His meteoric mid-career rise is a testament to him and the Jazz more than it’s an indictment of Cleveland.

The Cavs should actually feel better about their outlay now. Agbaji is already elsewhere, and while the Sexton contract has aged nicely, Utah would have moved him already if he were a hot commodity. The three additional first-round picks and two first-round swaps might sting. But Cleveland landed an All-NBA player who it just signed to an extension. Locking him down through 2026-27 (player option for 2027-28) validates what was already a justifiable move.

Granted, there’s still some risk at play. Cleveland’s Big Four regressed as a unit last season. It feels like that has more to do with stop-and-start availability. But if Mitchell and Darius Garland aren’t in lockstep moving forward or Evan Mobley’s offensive development is stymied by playing beside both guards and another center, this deal will be worth yet another look.

And even then, the Cavs are far from screwed. Every member of the Big Four is under team control for at least another three seasons, giving them plenty of time to figure it out—even if that clarity must be achieved through tinkering on the trade market.

Utah could not have hoped for a better return on Mitchell when factoring in how well Sexton has played and, most critically, Markkanen’s star ascent. They were even able to use Agbaji in tandem with Kelly Olynyk to bag a 2024 first-rounder (Isaiah Collier).

Concern starts to creep in and prevents them from nabbing a perfect re-grade on two fronts.

For starters, the distant Cleveland first-rounders no longer seem as juicy. Garland (free agent in 2028), Mitchell (2027-28 player option), Mobley (2030 free agent) and Jarrett Allen (2029 free agent) are all under long-term team control. The Cavs may still have to reorient the core at some point, but they’ll have the leverage in trade talks to ensure the floor never gets ripped out from underneath them.

Markkanen’s blastoff offsets much of that downside. He should command more as a trade asset on his extension, and if the Jazz elect to keep him, his offensive utility scales to any type of infrastructure they embrace.

But Utah may also be a victim of underestimation. It has outperformed early-season expectations each of the past two years. That necessitated midseason selloffs and shutdowns—none of which resulted in them securing higher than a No. 9 pick.

This leaves the Jazz in a funky position, ostensibly too good to tank without resorting to extremes yet not nearly ready enough to make noise in the Western Conference. Their next re-grade will hinge on what they do next.

Do they have enough youth to lean on Markkanen-plus-kids and increase their draft-lottery equity? Will they get lucky with one of their Cleveland (or Minnesota or Lakers) first-rounders? Can they use the bevy of assets at their disposal to acquire a player better than Markkanen who can serve as their organizational compass? Make no mistake, it’s a good problem to have, but if transcending the middle is the goal, it’s a problem all the same.